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The North East of India is little known and relatively little studied, within India as well as 
outside. Graham Chapman’s highly regarded book on the geo-politics of South Asia, for 
instance, treats it hardly at all.2 It is the region of the so-called ‘seven sisters’, of which 
Assam is by far and away the most populous, joined by Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura, 
Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh. All of these states, with the exception (I believe) 
of the last are marked in some way by insurgency movements. The Consultation Paper about 
the states, submitted to the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, 
begins as follows:  
 
The North East of India, home to numerous diverse communities and located 
strategically with borders with Bhutan, Tibet/China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, 
has seen much violence and bloodshed over the past few decades. These include 
insurgencies in the States of Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Tripura and Assam 
and the growth of militant groups in Meghalaya. In addition there are conflicts 
and confrontations over land use and control as well as issues of language, 
identity formation, demographic change and minority-majoritarian relations.   
 
In general conflict in the North East arises from the sense of alienation from the Indian state 
of many people whose aspirations lead them to assert their independent identities, and the 
commitment to India, on the other hand, of those social groups that have benefited from the 
high levels of subsidies paid out by the Indian government (and that are presumably reflected 
in part in the relatively low level of poverty in these states, at least according to official 
figures, and their relatively high levels of educational performance. These latter, however, 
also reflect the activities of Christian missionaries which probably account, in the main, for 
the fact that Mizoram has the highest levels of literacy in the country). It is likely, too, that 
both some politicians and some insurgents stand to benefit from the persistence of conflict, 
which draws the central government in to spend substantial resources in the region.  Tensions 
are also influenced by majority/minority and insider/outsider conflicts, as in Assam, cut 
across as they are by language issues.   
 
                                                 
1 This short paper outlines some of the background to the work which is being carried on with the Crisis States 
Programme in North East India, by Professors Apurba Baruah and Manorama Sharma of the North Eastern Hill 
University, Shillong, Meghalaya. It draws on the visit that I made to Shillong in March 2002, and on the text of 
a Consultation Paper on ‘Empowering and Strengthening of Panchayati Raj Institutions/Autonomous District 
Councils/ Traditional Tribal Governing Institutions in North East India’ submitted to the National Commission 
to Review the Working of the Constitution in December 2001. I shall refer to this henceforward as the 
‘Consultation Paper’. Professor Baruah was one of the main contributors to the writing of  the Paper. I have also 
benefited from discussion at the Symposium on ‘Conflicts in South Asia’ held by the South Asia Research 
Group in the School  of Development Studies at the University of East Anglia in June 2002. 
2 Graham Chapman, The Geopolitics of South Asia: from early empires to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh , 
Ashgate, 2000 
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Let me start with two anecdotes. On Easter Saturday I travelled from Shillong in Megha laya 
down into Assam and  the Brahmaputra Valley  with a young PhD student in history from 
Mizoram. As we drove he talked to me about his family, and as he did so he started to 
recount first his father’s experiences as a police officer, and then his own, witnessing the 
heavy-handed actions of Indian army jawans as they sought to control actual or supposed 
insurgents. It was evident from the way in which the young man described these experiences 
that he had been profoundly alienated from India through his perception of these actions. 
Then later in our talk he happened to mention that for his research he would need to visit an 
archive in Rangoon. It would be simple he said. He’d take a horse from his village, ride to the 
border, cross the river and then just travel down to Rangoon. Nobody would stop him, he 
said, because nobody would know that he was not Burmese, given the continuities of 
language and ethnicity between Mizoram and other parts of the North East with northern 
Burma. Then he surprised me by saying that, if there were a different, and more democratic 
regime in Burma, then he and he thought most people in Mizoram, Manipur and Meghalaya, 
at least, would rather be part of Burma than of India. It is perhaps only because Burma is not 
quite like Pakistan that the nationalities issues of the North Eastern states  have not become 
quite so explosive as those of Kashmir. The slogan of some people in the Khasi Hills of 
Meghalaya is “Khasi by blood, Indian by accident”. It is some of these people, I had learnt a 
day or so earlier, who were responsible for ‘seeing off’ the Chinese restaurateur from 
Calcutta who had run what had been considered to have been the best place to eat in Shillong. 
 
The second anecdote involves an account of a little bit of ‘research tourism’: 
 
March 29 2002: (both Good Friday and Holi). Visit to Nongkynrih Raid, about an hour’s 
drive from Shillong, set in hilly country with potato and vegetable cultivation especially on 
the slopes and paddy rice in the valley bottoms. Pig rearing also important. Meet the Rongbah 
Shnong (headman) of one of the seven Durbar Shnongs within the Raid. His Durbar has 180 
households. Only males are allowed to participate in the Durbar; outsiders if any there be, are 
excluded. He was ‘elected’ three years ago and expects to go on for as long as he is able. Not 
an open election but rather a process of establishing consensus. There is also a Secretary and 
nine executive members of the Durbar. They are all members of the Durbar Raid, which is 
headed by a Lyngdoh (which is a particular clan that customarily supplies the mentris 
[ministers] to the Syiem [‘King’]… and the people can only get the Lyngdoh changed by 
appealing to the head of Lyngdoh clan). There are a number of Raids within the Hima, of 
Tribal Kingdom (this is Hima Khyriem, under an hereditary Siyem. I understand that under 
the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India, which deals with these parts of the country, 
the Siyem should be appointed by the Dt Council, but the Rongbah Shnong says that the 
Syiem has to be acceptable to the people in the first instance; and it seems possible that the 
role of the District Council is much less in this Hima than is legislated for under Sixth 
Schedule. For example they access the forests around here by paying a tax to the Syiem, not 
to the District Council, which is what should be the case according to the legislation. [This 
may well be very significant, given the importance of access to timber in the politics of the 
North Eastern states. Timber is a major source of rents, and revenues from logging fuel much 
of the politics of the region3]. There are differences, perhaps, between Himas in the extent of 
the powers of the District Council. Here the only things that they get from the District 
Council, it is said, is what comes as a result of the MLA’s grant, spent, for example, on water 
supply and footpaths. We talked in the small secondary school. This was built by the Raid, in 
response to requests from the people; and the Raid appoints and pays the 4 teachers there; 
                                                 
3  I owe this point in part to Professor Piers Blaikie of the University of East Anglia 
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there is a sub-committee which supervises the School; students take their school leaving 
exams as independent candidates. This is an instance, perhaps, of the benefits of 
‘participation’ albeit in a context which denies democratic principles. 
 
 
‘Traditional’ Political Institutions  
This second of my anecdotes sets up the more specific problems that I want to address. Here 
apparently ‘traditional’ tribal political institutions remain highly significant in people’s lives. 
As my fieldnotes show, in the Khasi Hills of Meghalaya the traditional polity, which  “was 
regulated under a three tier system, with the Durbar Shnong i.e Village Council presided over 
by the Rongbah Shnong (headman) at the bottom, and the Durba Hima, i.e., State assembly 
presided over by the Syiem or equivalent of  a king at the apex (and) in between the Durbar 
Raid, presided over by an elected headman known as Basra or Lyngdoh, or Sirdar “ 
(Consultation Paper p 104) remains in place, alongside ‘modern’ institutions of government 
such as the District Council and the State Legislative Assembly.. The Rongbah Shnong is, as 
my notes suggest, in some sense ‘elected’ to the office by all inhabitants of the village 
irrespective of their clan affiliation; while representation at the Raid and Hima level is more 
rigid, for instance “the Siyem can only be elected from the Siyem’s family or its legitimate 
branch. The electoral council, besides mentris also comprise of other heads of clans. This 
electoral council used to elect and appoint the Syiem” (Consultation Paper p 104).  The 
Durbar Shnongs have a range of developmental, judicial and cultural functions (as I saw in 
Nongkynrih), and they are commonly approached to implement government programmes 
(such as Adult Literacy and Non-Formal Education); but they are said to have only “limited 
funds which are generally self-generated” (Consultation Paper). One of the objectives of our 
research is to find out more about how Durbars raise revenues and spend them, and relatedly 
about the legitimacy of these institutions. It is claimed by some, and assumed, perhaps, by 
others, that the Durbars are held by tribal people, if not by non-tribals, to exercise legitimate 
authority. Whether this is indeed so is being investigated by Professor Baruah. It is a matter 
of no little importance given the demands which are being made by representatives of the 
traditional institutions for Constitutional recognition. One memorandum which they have 
submitted states, for example, that “The inclusion of the Khasi states within the framework of 
the Indian Union was glaringly violative of the true and underlying spirit of the Instrument of 
Accession  …(and) A remedy of this Constitutional anomaly can be found by giving due 
recognition and protection of the traditional institutions under the Constitution of India” 
(Consultation Paper p 107). Correspondingly, the major political parties in Meghalaya all 
argue that the panchayat system, legislated for under the 73rd and 74th mendements to the 
Constitution of India, is not necessary for the state.  
 
These claims for them notwithstanding, the traditional political institutions are not 
democratic, though they are also instruments of at least a certain kind or degree of local 
participation, and they may be effective means of resolving local problems of collective 
action. They exclude outsiders; and we have some evidence from the studies that are now in 
process that outsiders are treated differently before the law than are tribal insiders, and can be 
scape-goated whilst  tribal insiders are in effect protected from the police. Women are 
excluded altogether from the rural Durbar that I visited in Nongkynrih, and in the urban 
Durbar in Shillong that I also went to the Chairman, a former Education Department official, 
was frank that though women are now also considered as members, they are not eligible for 
election to the executive. The notion of ‘election’, too, probably does not at all accurately 
reflect the process whereby the leadership emerges. It will be surprising if the research that  
Professor Baruah is now conducting does not show that Rongbah Shnongs and executive 
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members are all men from high status families, who decide upon the leadership amongst 
themselves. Though money maybe lies with the regular government bodies, authority lies 
with the Durbars; and it seems that anyone wishing to pursue a political career in Meghalaya 
probably needs a secure base in the Durbars. In other words we seem to have to do with a 
kind of local association which is effective, powerful and also not at all democratic, and 
which is the basis of  tribal identity and separateness, and may therefore augment the forces 
of separatism – and of conflict. Separatist sentiments re fostered for example by youth 
organisations in Meghalaya, with the Non-Tribal Youth Union pitted against Khasi (tribal) 
groups. .There are important connections, it  seems, between the Durbars and the powerful 
Khasi Students Union and with the Federation of Khasi and Jaintia Peoples (the goals of each 
of which are ‘modern’ though the methods they deploy involve calls upon tradition and 
erhnicity), and with the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council which is described as “not 
quite a secessionist movement”, but which is armed and uses the slogan “Khasi by blood, 
Indian by accident”. 
 
In some ways the tribal durbars of Meghalaya (and elsewhere in the North East) strike me as 
being comparable with the many other kinds of parallel structures that exist or that have 
arisen in different parts of the world and that represent a kind of ‘bifurcation’, standing  as 
alternatives to the institutions of modern states. Another example, though of a different kind, 
is the institution in different African states of gangs of  something very like vigilantes 
encouraged, as in Tanzania, to function  in the place of the police and even the judiciary.   
 
 
Conflicts of Authority 
The problems that are posed for a modern, democratic state by the strength of these tribal 
institutions was recognised by the authors of the Constitution of India, who aimed at 
accommodation of tribal aspirations and identities within the democratic framework through 
‘tribal self-rule’. The Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, applying to the tribals of Central 
India was frankly paternalistic, but the Sixth Schedule (mentioned above) envisaged 
instruments of tribal self- rule for the North East (then all part of greater Assam) and set up 
special Autonomous District Councils, which were sometimes exempted from national laws 
and the influence of parliament. In Meghalaya ADCs were set up for each of the three tribal 
regions, the Khasi, Jaintia and Garo Hills, which had somewhat distinct traditional ruling 
systems headed by Syiems in the Khasi Hills, the Dolois of Jaintia and the Nokmas of the 
Garos. The Syiems of the Khasis are most influential and organised and it is said in the 
Consultation Paper that “the Syiemships are a clan based political system more in line of a 
feudal and monarchical political authority than [what are often supposed to be] tribal 
democratic traditions. The limited political participation available to the common tribal 
under the traditional system need not necessarily fulfil the political aspirations of newly-
emerging, forward-looking tribal elites” (emphasis added, JH). The functions of the 
Autonomous District Councils, and of the state legislatures came to overlap in the North 
Eastern states covered by the Sixth Schedule, while the Syiems (or their equivalents) and 
their Durbars remained excluded in principle whilst retaining significant powers in practice 
(though more in some regions, like the Khasi Hills of Meghalaya, than in some others). Thus, 
it is said in the Consultation Paper that  “It could be cogently argued that in Meghalaya there 
are … three competing systems of authority, each of which is seeking to ‘serve’ or represent 
the same constituency. The result has been confusion and confrontation especially at the local 
level  on a number of issues”. Confrontation was expressed quite recently when elections 
could not be held to the Shillong Municipality because of the pressure from some political 
parties, student organisations and other non-government groups (in spite of a Supreme Court 
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ruling ordering the elections). And in the Khasi Hills, in particular, non-tribals have rarely 
contested or won elections, and there are charges that non-tribals are not encouraged to vote 
in elections and that their names are often deleted from the rolls.   
   
In 2001 it was being argued again, in the Consultation Paper for the Constitutional Review 
Committee, that, “Trends towards militancy … can be discouraged through measures leading 
to self-governance. For this to happen the traditional systems of governance will have to be 
included and given specific roles and opportunities, instead of being marginalised as they 
have been for decades”. This recalls the intent ions behind the Sixth Schedule, and is a 
response, as I understand it, to the facts that I have just recounted about the overlaps of 
authority and responsibility and resulting confrontations.  What is being proposed now, in the 
context of the general intention to establish decentralised government enshrined in the 73rd 
and 74th amendments is to set up a three-tier system, with the First Tier being “representative 
of existing village councils and traditional systems … where such institutions are strong and 
functional. This may be called the Durbar in the Khasi Hills and by the local nomenclature 
elsewhere and may comprise elected members of each village from the community/traditional 
systems”. This tier is expected to deal with such matters as village roads, births and deaths 
registry, marriages, property alienation, water bodies, forests, education, agriculture (etc) - all 
of which seems like quite a tall order. Larger issues and subjects go the Second Tier, 
amended District Councils, under the overall supervision of the State Legislature as the Third 
Tier, that delegates powers, as under the 73rd Amendment, to local governing bodies. 
 
 But the argument that “Careful steps should be taken to devolve political powers through the 
intermediate and local- level traditional political organisations”, as will be clear probably from 
the short accounts that I have given of the Durbars I visited, still poses a serious dilemma. 
This is pointed up in the later statement in the same paragraph of the Consultation Paper:, 
when it says that powers should be devolved through the traditional political institutions “ 
provided their traditional practices carried out in a modern world do not deny legitimate 
democratic rights to/of any section in their contemporary society” (emphasis added, JH).  It 
can surely be asked whether those who drew up the consultation paper (who included the 
leading politiciam from Meghalaya and sometime Speaker of the Lok Sabha, P A Sangma) 
weren’t suggesting the combination of opposites. The rhetoric of the Paper only seems to 
underline the point. It goes on: “The details of state-wise steps to devolve such powers will 
have to be carefully considered in a proper representative meeting of traditional leaders of 
each community …”. Yet  “The system of in-built safeguards, such as the Sixth Schedule, 
should be maintained and strengthened for the minority groups while empowering them with 
greater responsibilities and opportunities”, and while “traditional forms of governance must 
be associated with self-governance because of the political failure of local elites … positive 
elements like gender justice and adult franchise should be built into these institutions to make 
them broader based and capable of dealing with a changing world where globalisation is 
critical …”. The practical steps that are proposed to secure gender justice and adult franchise 
are the usual ones of setting aside reserved seats and constituencies. The question is whether 
the circle (of working through traditional institutions whilst making them correspond with the 
standards of a modern civil society) really can be squared in this way. 
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